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
TO : Chief, Industrial Division

DATE: 27 June 1957

FROM : Chief, Shipbuilding Branch

SUBJECT: CIA/RR-G-15, Comments on.

The following comments on the subject report are submitted for your information.



SEGNA

Approved For Release 2000/08/26: CIA-RDP61S00137A000100110003-5

A. page 34, second paragraph. "The yard's maximum annual construction capability is estimated to be 282,000 gross tons (grt) or 224,000 naval standard displacement tons (nsdt)."

Comment: This statement was taken from ONI Port Series March 25X1A2g 1955, page 4, (see attachment A). Page 6 of the same reference gives entirely different figures - *371,000 gross register tons of shelter-deck standard cargo vessels or 429,000 gross register tons of passenger vessels could be built annually....235,000 tons naval standard displacement could be built annually.* (See attachment B)

These figures first appeared in the ONI draft of Section 64E, NIS 26 for coordination by I/SH. As explained in Captain Sexton's memo to the AD/RR, 12 February 1957, (see attachment C) because of the many errors and deficiencies the NIS draft was withdrawn by ONI and rewritten. In the meanwhile ONI had separately published ONI Port Series and 25X1A2g 46-62 containing a word for word copy of the entire rejected ONI draft of Section 64E, NIS 26.

The ONI rewrite of 64E, NIS 26 shows an entirely different estimate of capability. The final draft, coordinated with I/SH, concludes that the national (USSR) capability is about 750,000 naval standard displacement tons annually, of which the whole Arctic area is capable of producing about 12 percent of the national, or 90,000 tons. (See attachment D)

In CIA/RR PR-70, I/SH estimated that the maximum capability on a 1 shift basis is about 38,750 sdt. (See attachment E) Shipyards in the US during World War II on a 3 shift basis produced 1.7 to 2 times 1 shift production. By US analogy, Molotovsk could produce between 66,000 and 78,000 sdt annually on a 3 shift basis. The 78,000 sdt for Molotovsk would compare favorably with the 90,000 sdt estimated by ONI for the entire Arctic.

CIA/RR PR-70 was coordinated with ONI prior to publication. The ONI estimate, at the time of coordination of PR-70, based on slightly different utilization of way space than I/SH, was 45,000 annually on a 1 shift basis. (See attachment $\mathbb E$)

Because of the difference in complexity between naval vessels and merchant types it is normally possible to produce about 2 grt to 1 sdt in a given space of time, therefore, capability estimate should reflect this difference and in about the same order of magnitude.

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B. page 35, first paragraph, lines 4 and 5. "...which have a combined annual shipbuilding capacity (capacity based on one-shift operation) estimated at 52,400 grt or 51,700 nsdt."

Comment: These estimates are not consistent with the rewrite of Section 64E, NIS 26. Moreover, the tonnage figures reflect similar construction complexity which is not the case.

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C. page 36, last sentence in first paragraph. "However, with production per person equal to that of US workers, an estimated 21,000 workers would be required to operate the yard on a full three-shift basis."

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Comment; This statement also was taken from ONI Port Series March 1955, page 7. (See attachment F).

Based on data obtained from the US Navy Department Bureau of Ships the following tabulation shows required man-hours to construct certain naval vessel types in the US.

Type of Vessel	Man Years/sdt
Light Cruiser Destroyer Submarine	0.236 0.367 0.442

Assuming the Molotovsk yard engages in producing equal tonnage in each class, then the average man years/sdt would be 0.348. This is based on a US 2,000-hour man-year. As the Soviet worker works about 2,200 hours/man-year, the required man-years/sdt in the USSR would be about 0.316. To construct 224,000 sdt annually would require about 71,000 workers, over 3 times the 21,000 workers mentioned on page 36 G-15 as representing full three-shift employment.

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D. page 36, third paragraph, last sentence. "Although strictly a ship repair yard, it is reportedly being developed into a first class shipyard that may possibly build submarines and destroyers."

Comment: The source of this statement is credited to Navy, CINCLANT. FF1-2/A8-3,003/62, 20 January 1956, Northwest USSR Area Study, 271 pages, Secret/NOFORN. Also, it appears in NIS 26, Arctic Coast, Supplement I, Part B, Ports and Naval Facilities, pages 2-22, March 1951, Confidential.

The ONI Port Series March 1955, does not indicate future development of the Rosta Shipyard along these lines. There is no evidence available in I/SH to support the conclusion that the shipyard will become a building yard.

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Page 21 of ONI Port Series states that "The yard is strictly a ship-repair yard and has no shipbuilding ways, although it is possible that during World War II some torpedo boats and submarines were assembled here from parts fabricated elsewhere." This statement and the statement of estimated future operations, page 26 of ONI Port Series 46-62, is generally concurred in by I/SH. (See attachment G)